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Abstract
The authors empirically analyze the price-setting behaviour of the major Canadian banks in the
residential mortgage market over the period 1991–2007. They use weekly posted prices of the
major mortgage providers to study the degree of competition in mortgage price setting. Their
results suggest that the residential mortgage market is imperfectly competitive. They ﬁnd distinct
price leaders and that, as market concentration increases, so does price dispersion – helped by the
increased use of discounting from posted prices. The authors also ﬁnd that, although banks’ pass-
through of input price changes to mortgage prices is complete in the long run under reasonable
assumptions regarding discounting, there exists some level of pricing asymmetry in the short run.
JEL classiﬁcation: G2, D4
Bank classiﬁcation: Financial institutions; Financial services
Résumé
Les auteurs analysent empiriquement les pratiques des grandes banques canadiennes en ce qui
concerne l’établissement des prix sur le marché des prêts hypothécaires à l’habitation au cours de
la période 1991-2007. Pour évaluer le degré de concurrence dans la détermination de ces prix, ils
utilisent les taux – publiés chaque semaine – des principaux prêteurs hypothécaires. Leurs
résultats semblent indiquer que le marché des prêts hypothécaires à l’habitation est
imparfaitement concurrentiel. Les auteurs observent une nette présence de chefs de ﬁle en matière
de prix et notent que, à mesure que le marché devient plus concentré, la dispersion des prix
augmente, favorisée par l’octroi accru de rabais par rapport aux taux publiés. Ils constatent
également qu’il existe une certaine asymétrie dans l’établissement des prix à court terme même si,
à long terme, les banques répercutent complètement les variations du prix des intrants sur leurs
taux hypothécaires, selon des hypothèses raisonnables quant aux rabais consentis.
Classiﬁcation JEL : G2, D4
Classiﬁcation de la Banque : Institutions ﬁnancières; Services ﬁnanciers1 Introduction
Most studies ¯nd that the Canadian banking industry is monopolistically competitive
(Bikker, Spierdijk, and Finnie (2006), Allen and Liu (2007)). This implies that banks
have some degree of market power regarding the prices of services they sell. Since
mortgages are an important product for Canadian banks (representing around 31 per
cent of total income) and the largest liability of Canadian households (representing
almost 70 per cent of total debt), it is interesting to examine how competitively banks
set residential mortgage rates.
In this paper, we empirically analyze the competitiveness of major Canadian banks'
residential mortgage rate-setting behaviour over the 1991 to 2007 period. We use
a new micro dataset consisting of individual banks' posted mortgage rates to study
this price-setting behaviour. In doing so, we analyze the determinants of Canadian
mortgage rates and ¯nd that they have changed since previous papers were published
on this subject, such as Caron (1992) and Clinton and Howard (1994). In particular,
the role of future interest rate expectations is more signi¯cant in our sample than
those of earlier periods.
This paper provides the most comprehensive review of competition in the Canadian
mortgage market that we are aware of by studying the issues from three perspectives:
price leadership, pricing asymmetries, and long run pass-through of capital market
rates to mortgage rates. Each of these measures provides some insight into how
Canadian banks set prices. Throughout, we relate our empirical ¯ndings to theoretical
papers on price competition in the banking literature and suggest further avenues of
research on mortgage markets.
First, we use a discrete choice framework, similar to that of de Haan and Sterken
(2006), to look for evidence of price leadership, or whether some banks systematically
react to movements in input costs more quickly than other banks. Berger (1995)
argues that dominant banks are able to set pricing less competitively, which may
manifest itself in higher, more rigid, and asymmetric prices. It would likely be in
the best interest of other banks to follow the dominant's bank's pricing strategy,
so a clear price leadership relationship in conjunction with those indicators would
probably imply imperfect competition. We ¯nd some evidence of price-leadership
from the banks that have the largest share of the mortgage market, on average, over
1our sample period.
Second, we consider the size of banks' markups and whether changes in capital market
rates are fully passed through to mortgage rates in the long run. It is important for
central banks to understand the degree of pass-through, since this will help them judge
the required magnitude of monetary policy actions. Higher markups for a particular
bank may signal either that it has market power or that it is less e±cient and faces
higher funding costs. Higher markups combined with lower pass-through likely, but
not necessarily, indicate that a bank has market power. The work of Kashyap and
Stein (2000) indicates that lower pass-through can be the result of a bank being
highly liquid and well capitalized, which allows it to smooth rates and react less to
monetary policy than other banks. We examine how mortgage rates react to di®erent
capital market rates - the Bank Rate, Bankers' acceptance rate, short- and long-
term treasury bill rates, and government bond rates. When we base our analysis on
posted mortgage rates, we ¯nd that long run pass-through is incomplete, and that
banks with the highest markups and lowest pass-through are the dominant banks
in the mortgage market, although the di®erences across banks do not appear to be
economically important.1 When we take mortgage discounting into account, which we
argue produces a more meaningful, though more di±cult, measure of pass-through,
we ¯nd that pass-through is complete.
Lastly, we test whether changes in ¯xed residential mortgage rates feature asymmetry
- that is, whether cost increases are passed through more quickly than cost decreases,
and whether banks adjust mortgage rates upwards more quickly than downwards to
reach equilibrium. Asymmetries that favour the lender may signal imperfect compe-
tition. Speci¯cally, if the market is concentrated, if banks have market power, or if
consumers face search costs, banks may pass on increases in input costs more quickly
than cost decreases to mortgage rates. Asymmetries may also simply result from the
fact that Canadian mortgage rate o®ers are guaranteed for up to 120 days, so that the
borrower will receive the lowest of the guaranteed rate and the rate prevailing at the
time the loan is taken. Cooper (1986) ¯nds that this type of pricing policy can lead
¯rms to pass on cost increases more quickly than cost decreases. On the other hand,
banks encounter moral-hazard and adverse-selection problems when raising rates, be-
cause by doing so they narrow the pool to riskier borrowers. Banks may therefore
1This is true for the 5-year mortgage, which is the most popular mortgage term in Canada. For
the much less popular 3-year mortgage, one of the price leaders actually had the lowest markup and
highest pass-through.
2be reluctant to raise rates when faced with a temporary cost shock. We ¯nd some
evidence that banks pass on cost increases more quickly than cost decreases.
Our ¯ndings generally support the conclusion that the price setting behaviour of the
major Canadian banks is imperfectly competitive. Speci¯cally, the dominant banks
act as price leaders to the other banks, and all banks induce search frictions by posting
prices that di®er from transactions prices. While pass-through of funding costs to
e®ective mortgage rates appears to be complete, banks display some asymmetry in
the timing of the pass-through.
This paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we discuss the structure of the
Canadian mortgage market. In section 3 we report our empirical analysis of price
movements in the Canadian mortgage market. We examine price leadership, the
interest rate channel of the monetary transmission mechanism, and pricing asymmetry
using weekly posted mortgage rates of Canada's most important mortgage lenders and
a variety of market rates. Section 4 concludes.
2 The Canadian Mortgage Market
At the end of 2007, the size of the Canadian mortgage market was $818 billion, rep-
resenting approximately one-third of total credit outstanding. The mortgage market
is dominated by the six largest Canadian commercial banks, whose combined market
share, shown in Figure 1, increased from 39 per cent at the start of our sample to 65
per cent by 2007.2 The increase in market share was largely the result of the major
banks acquiring trust companies over the 1992 to 2000 period.
As market concentration increased, so did price dispersion. The coe±cient of cross-
sectional variation of the 5-year mortgage terms across all banks in our sample (Figure
2) and for the big six (Figure 3) increased substantially over our sample period.3 The
dispersion in mortgage rates allows us to study price-leadership.
2The six largest banks by asset size (the big six) are: the Bank of Montreal (BMO), CIBC
(CIBC), National Bank (NAT), RBC Financial Group (RBC), Scotiabank (BNS) and TD Bank
Financial Group (TD).
3The coe±cient of variation is slightly misleading, because in the post-2000 period a \no haggle"
mortgage (where the posted rate equalled the transactions rate) was o®ered from November 2002 to
August 2004 (TD) and from March 2005 to May 2006 (BMO).
3Five of the six major banks have extensive operations across Canada, whereas Na-
tional Bank's operations are located primarily in the province of Quebec. The major
banks set pricing nationally by posting a mortgage rate that applies to borrowers
across the country. This means that we cannot analyze how the degree of competi-
tion in individual local markets a®ects major banks' rates in those markets.
Historically, a large majority of Canadian mortgages have had ¯xed 5-year terms.
While we do not have data on the shares of various mortgage products throughout
our entire sample period, the Canadian Financial Monitor Survey, conducted by Ipsos
Reid indicates that 63 per cent of mortgages held by households surveyed between
1999 and 2007 had a ¯xed 5-year term, while 5 and 12 per cent had mortgages with
one- and 3-year terms, respectively.
In the early 1990s, some high-quality borrowers started receiving discounts on posted
mortgage rates, meaning that the rate paid by some borrowers (the e®ective rate)
was lower than the posted mortgage rate. Our estimates of mortgage rate discounts
are based on an exponentially smoothed version of survey information and anecdotal
evidence from banks and mortgage brokers. Discounts are believed to have increased
from approximately 25 basis points in the early 1990s to around 125 basis points at
the end of our sample. Discounts received by individual borrowers likely depend on
factors such as credit score, age, mortgage term and loan amount, and the customer's
relationship with the bank. We believe that the spread between e®ective mortgage
rates and banks' funding costs has actually remained stable as mortgage rate discounts
increased (see Traclet (2005)).
The very fact that mortgage rates tend to be discounted suggests that mortgage pric-
ing is imperfectly competitive. Speci¯cally, the practice of posting rates that exceed
actual transactions rates impedes price discovery and increases consumer search costs.
See the seminal paper by Stigler (1961) or the recent paper by Raskovich (2007) for
an example of bargaining discounts on posted prices. Furthermore, absent di®erences
in borrower riskiness, transactions rates should be the same for di®erent customers
under perfect competition. This is not the case in the Canadian market. As noted by
the Canadian Mortgage and Housing Corporation (CMHC (2005)), \Rate discounts
tend to be larger for lower-risk, asset-rich borrowers living in highly competitive mar-
kets."4
4An argument can be made that, over our sample period, the widespread adoption of mortgage
broker services by mortgage seekers has lowered the search frictions caused by high posted rates.
4Depending on the question, we use posted and/or discounted mortgage rates for our
analysis. We use posted rates for price-leadership, because we are interested in the
signal given by mortgage rate changes. We use our estimate of discounted rates,
where possible,5 for the analysis of pass-through, because we are interested in how
changes in banks' funding costs are passed onto e®ective mortgage rates (which is
more important, from a monetary policy perspective, than the signal given by the
posted rate).
3 Empirical Analysis
Our empirical analysis is conducted using weekly posted rates by the six largest
Canadian banks for the period January 1991 to June 2007. Approximate mortgage
rate discounts are applied in certain parts of the analysis. Posted mortgage rate data
were collected every Wednesday from the Globe & Mail newspaper archives. The big
six banks currently represent around 65 per cent of the mortgage market share and
are therefore considered the major ¯rms in the industry. The banks o®er a variety
of ¯xed mortgage rates, ranging from 6 months to 10 years.6 The 10-year rate began
to be o®ered only in October of 1996 by four of the big six. A ¯fth bank started
o®ering a 10-year rate in March 1999. We therefore exclude it from this analysis.
We also exclude the 6-month rate for similar reasons. Finally, since our focus is on
¯xed mortgage rates, we exclude variable mortgages, which have only recently become
popular. Future work might want to consider variable rate mortgages as their market
share relative to ¯xed-rate mortgages have recently increased.
Since brokers theoretically have access to many lenders they can o®er a better rate, thereby enhancing
competition. This may be true for a certain class of borrowers, just as above, but there remains
substantial variation in who receives a discount and the level of the discount.
5The discount estimate is available only for the 5-year mortgage rate and not for other, less
popular terms.
6Occasionally, some Canadian banks have o®ered a 25-year mortgage rate, but, unlike the U.S.
experience, mortgage terms in Canada are relatively short.
53.1 Price leadership
The only paper we are aware of that studies price-leadership in the mortgage market
is by de Haan and Sterken (2006). They hypothesize that the dominant bank is
likely to show little or no sensitivity to the pricing decisions of other banks, and
that non-dominant banks would react to this by not changing their price until the
dominant bank does. de Haan and Sterken (2006) expect that there will not be a
systematic price leader in a perfectly competitive market, but that the market would
deviate from perfect competition if there were a systematic price leader. While they
¯nd a price leader in the Dutch mortgage market, they also ¯nd that banks set rates
competitively using the Coccorese (2005) conjectural variation model.
Table 2 shows the distribution of weekly price changes in the Canadian residential
mortgage market for the 1-, 3- and 5- year rates. Most of the time (between 63 and
66 per cent depending on the term), prices do not change. When prices do change,
between 13 and 16 per cent of the time all six banks move, between 6 and 8 per cent
of the time, only one bank moves. We are interested in analyzing whether some banks
always move ¯rst and who follows.
The modelling approach is a standard discrete choice framework. Every week, a bank
has three choices: maintain the previous week's rate, lower the rate, or increase the
rate. This choice can be written as follows:
Ci;t = ®ri;t¡1 +
X
j6=i
¯jrj;t¡1 + ¸rM;t¡1; (1)
where Ci is the choice of bank i, either neutral (0), up (1), or down (-1); ri;t¡1 is bank
i's posted rate at t ¡ 1; rj;t¡1 is bank j's posted price at t ¡ 1; and rM is the market
rate. The market rate is meant to capture the cost of funding for banks. If the cost
of funding increases (decreases), banks will increase (decrease) the rate at which they
will lend. We consider four alternatives for the market rate: the rate at which the
Bank of Canada will lend funds to ¯nancial institutions for one day (the Bank Rate),
the 90-day Bankers' acceptance rate (90-d BA), the 3-month and 1-year Treasury Bill
rates (T-bills), and three di®erent government bond rates (the bond rate that we use
depends on the mortgage term, and proxies banks' funding costs). We also adjust
the bond rate using the swap rate, meaning that we are using a swap-adjusted rate.
Table 1 reports the correlation matrix for the Bank Rate, T-bill rates and the 3-, 5-,
6and 10-year bond rates. The correlation between the Bank Rate, T-bill rates, and
the bond rates is relatively high. Figure 4 shows the swap rate plotted against the
5-year Government of Canada bond rate. Because banks hold short-term liabilities
(deposits) and long-term assets (mortgages), there is a maturity mismatch. Banks
therefore use swaps to hedge their position. The T-bill rates typically move according
to the market's belief about the Bank Rate.7;8
The main coe±cients of interest in equation (1) are ¸ and ¯j. The ¯rst should be
positive if mortgage rate changes follow the market rates. If bank i follows bank j,
then ¯j will be positive. If bank i moves in the opposite direction of bank j, then ¯j
will be negative. If the banks set their rates independently of each other, then the
coe±cient will be zero.
We include market rates to test the mechanism whereby they a®ect administered
rates. If the central bank attempts to tighten monetary policy by increasing the
borrowing rate and this is not passed on to consumers in the form of higher mortgage
rates, then the transmission mechanism is weak or non-existent. Although outdated,
Smith (1974) ¯nds evidence that mortgage rates tend to adjust more slowly than
other capital market rates. Goebel and Ma (1993) and Allen, Rutherford, and Wiley
(1999) ¯nd that capital markets and mortgage markets are more integrated post-1980
than pre-1980, and they attribute the level of integration to deregulation. As the swap
market developed, bond rates became more closely linked to banks' funding costs at
long maturities than other market rates.9 The bond rate also captures expectations
of how the central bank will adjust its Bank Rate. In this sense, bank mortgage rates
might move more in line with bond rates than the Bank Rate.
We report results for the 1-, 3-, and 5-year mortgage rates in Tables 3 to 6 using
the Bank Rate and T-bill rates, and in Tables 7 and 8 using a swap-adjusted bond
rate.10 For each mortgage term, we estimate an ordered probit model for the whole
sample (1991-2007) and two subsamples (1991-2000) and (2001-2007). We divide the
7From March 1980 to February 1996, the Bank Rate was actually set as the average yield on
the 3-month T-bill plus 25 basis points. Therefore, the causality is reversed in the ¯rst part of our
sample.
8None of the ordered probit estimates is statistically signi¯cant when using the 30-day rates as
proxies for cost of funding. This means that mortgage rates do not follow the 30-day rates in our
sample.
9Note also that this weakened the link between mortgages and guaranteed investment certi¯cates.
10Results are nearly identical when we use the 90-day T-bill and 3-month Bankers' acceptance
rates instead of the Bank Rate. Accordingly, we do not provide these results.
7sample in 2000, since that is the approximate period when the coe±cient of variation
in posted prices increased substantially. The end of the year 2000 also coincides
with the Bank of Canada implementing ¯xed announcement dates for its decisions
regarding changes in the Bank Rate.
3.1.1 One-year mortgage rates
Results for the 1-year mortgage and Bank Rate, reported in Table 3, suggest that,
for the whole sample as well as the ¯rst subsample, all of the banks followed the
Bank Rate. It is also the case that CIBC and RBC are price leaders. In the post-
2000 sample, neither the Bank Rate nor the 90-d T-bill rate are signi¯cant. Table 4
reports results for the 1-year mortgage and the 1-year T-bill. Perhaps not surprisingly,
given the matched term, the 1-year T-bill rate is a signi¯cant leader of 1-year ¯xed
mortgages in all subsamples. The results for the 1-year T-bill rate, therefore, are
more aligned with those we ¯nd in the following sections using bond rates than with
those we ¯nd using short-term rates.
3.1.2 Three-year mortgage rates
Results reported in Table 5 for the 3-year posted mortgage rate with the Bank Rate
as the market rate are similar to those reported in Table 3. For the whole sample
and the ¯rst subsample, all the Canadian banks follow the Bank Rate. We also ¯nd
that CIBC and RBC are price leaders. In the whole and the post-2000 sample, we
¯nd that the NAT takes its lead from TD.11
Results in Table 5 can be compared to results reported in Table 7, which uses the
3-year bond rate instead of the Bank Rate. In this case, in the whole sample and
the two subsamples, all of the banks follow the bond rate. There is no clear price
leader in the 1991-2000 subsample, but CIBC emerges as the clear price leader in the
post-2000 sample.
11In the province of Quebec the Caisses Desjardins is a signi¯cant lender and it is likely that the
National Bank would take the lead from them. Weekly data for this credit union, however, are
unavailable over our sample period; therefore, we cannot test this hypothesis.
83.1.3 Five-year mortgage rates
Table 6 reports results for the 5-year posted mortgage rate with the Bank Rate as
the market rate. For the complete sample, CIBC and RBC are price leaders. The
Bank Rate leads, in a statistical sense, BNS, CIBC, and NAT. For the 1991-2000
subsample, the evidence of price leadership is more ambiguous at the 5-year rate
than at the shorter rates. We ¯nd that BNS follows CIBC and RBC. For the post-
2000 subsample, all the banks follow CIBC, and all but MTL follow RBC. As with
the short-term rates, the Bank Rate is not statistically signi¯cant in the latter sample
period.
Table 8 reports results for the 5-year bond rate. As per the results in Table 7, the
bond rate is a clear price leader for all samples. CIBC and RBC are price leaders, as
well, for the whole sample. In the post-2000 subsample, CIBC is the price leader.
We ¯nd a weakening link between the shorter-term rates (Bank Rate, Bankers' ac-
ceptance rate, and 90-day treasury bill rate) and the ¯xed mortgage rates after the
year 2000. A strong link remains, however, throughout the sample between the gov-
ernment bond rates and ¯xed mortgage rates. This result is expected, given the Bank
of Canada's decision to implement a system of ¯xed announcement dates (FADs) for
the target overnight interest rate in late 2000. Empirical evidence by Parent (2003)
shows that, in the pre-FAD period, changes to the overnight rate had a signi¯cant
impact on longer-term interest rates, but they did not have this impact in the FAD
period. In the latter period, ¯nancial markets became \able to accurately anticipate
the general trends in interest rates" (Parent 2002-2003, 33) which means that banks
could price longer-term contracts based more accurately on their longer-term funding
costs. Furthermore, expected future changes in the overnight rate may be partially in-
corporated into mortgage rates, so these rates would not necessarily change following
a change to the Bank Rate.
To summarize, the results reveal three main ¯ndings. First, price leadership appears
more prevalent in the ¯rst part of the sample. It may be, however, that the price
leadership relationship has not weakened, but that price followers adjust mortgage
rates too quickly after a change by the price leader(s) for us to be able to pick this up in
our results based on weekly data. Second, in the latter part of the sample, mortgage
rates follow short-term rates less frequently and long-term rates more frequently.
9Third, consistent with de Haan and Sterken (2006), the banks that are, on average,
largest by mortgage asset size over our sample are the most frequent price leaders.
Speci¯cally, CIBC is the most frequent price leader, followed by RBC and TD.
3.2 Pass-through
This section examines the e®ective pass-through of movements in the Government
of Canada bond rates to bank mortgage rates. We consider long- and short-run
pass-through of the 3- and 5-year bond rates to the 3- and 5-year mortgage rates,
respectively.12 Combined, the 3- and 5-year ¯xed rate mortgage contracts make up
75 per cent of the market.
The size of markups and the completeness of the pass-through of banks' funding costs
are often thought to be related to the degree of competition in the market. A number
of authors ¯nd that rates are more rigid in concentrated markets: Hannan and Berger
(1991) and Neumark and Sharpe (1992) for U.S. deposit rates, Arbatskaya and Baye
(2004) for U.S. Internet mortgage rates, and Mojon (2000) for loan and deposit rates
in many European countries. De Graeve, De Jonghe, and Vander Vennet (2007) also
¯nd that dominant Dutch banks - i.e., those with a large market share and capital base
tend to charge higher loan markups and have lower long run pass-through. de Haan
and Sterken (2006) con¯rm that one dominant Dutch bank displays dominant pricing
behaviour. Finally, many papers, including Mojon (2000), De Graeve, De Jonghe,
and Vander Vennet (2007), and Hofmann and Mizen (2004) for U.K. mortgage and
deposit rates, ¯nd that pass-through is incomplete.
Previous research on Canadian mortgage rates has focused on explaining short- and
long-run movements in the average or \typical" (de¯ned as the median rate charged by
the big six banks) mortgage rate, leaving out possible heterogeneity across banks (for
example, Caron (1992); Clinton and Howard (1994)). On average, these researchers
¯nd that the median mortgage rates responded quickly to changes in the median
short-term rates, which means that pass-through is strong.
12In preliminary analysis, we also considered the Bank Rate and T-bill rate as market rates.
We reject the null hypothesis that the relationship between these short-term rates and the posted
mortgage rates are stable over time, and therefore we do not focus on these relationships.
10Consider the following linear regression:
mi;t = ®i + ¯ibt + ²i;t; (2)
where mi;t is the mortgage rate for bank i at time t, and bt is the bond rate. We
conduct analysis of pass-through to posted mortgage rates for both the 3- and 5-
year mortgage terms. In addition, since we have an estimated 5-year mortgage rate
discount series, we conduct analysis based on 5-year discounted mortgage rates. Given
that this is a better proxy for the rates borrowers are actually paying, we put more
stock in the results obtained using the 5-year discounted series than in those obtained
using the posted rate series.
After pre-testing, not reported here, we model the residuals with a GARCH(1,1)
process: ²i;t » N(0;hi;t), where hi;t = ai;0 + ai;1²2
i;t¡1 + ai;2hi;t¡1. The presence of
conditional heteroskedasticity can a®ect the rejection rate of unit root tests (for ex-
ample, see Alexakis and Apergis (1996)). The mortgage rates and bond rates are
non-stationary.13 Table 9 reports tests for the null hypothesis of no cointegration be-
tween the 3- and 5-year bond rates and bank rates. We reject the null hypothesis and
therefore ¯nd evidence of cointegration. In the long run, therefore, we can interpret
¯i as the amount of pass-through from bond rate movements to bank mortgage rates.
In a reduced-form way, and if ¯ = 1, we can also interpret ®i as a markup rate.14
Table 10 reports parameter estimates for pass-through to posted mortgage rates. We
¯nd incomplete pass-through of changes in bond rates to changes in posted mortgage
rates. There is some dispersion in markup and pass-through parameters across banks.
The two dominant banks, in terms of market share and price leadership - CIBC and
RBC - have the highest markups and lowest pass-through for the 5-year mortgage.
The di®erences across banks, however, do not appear to be economically important.
The last two columns of Table 10 report regression estimates using the discounted
5-year rate. In this case, the markup is substantially lower than in the posted-rate
case, and pass-through is complete. Why is this the case? Over our sample period,
the bond rate is downward trending and the discount upward trending, implying that
the rates are negatively correlated. Omitting the discount rate, therefore, leads to a
13This is expected, since rates generally fell during the 1990s as the Bank of Canada brought
in°ation down. Results for the stationarity tests are available upon request.
14More generally, the markup is equal to ® ¡ (1 ¡ ¯)b.
11downward bias in pass-through in the posted rate regression. For the markup, if the
true model has complete pass-through and we use the posted rates, the typical gap
between the posted rate and the bond rate would rise over time, and the intercept
term would increase as the discount increases.
We next consider short run dynamics, allowing for the possibility of asymmetry. That
is, we test whether cost increases are passed through more quickly than cost decreases,
or whether banks adjust their mortgage rates upwards more quickly than downwards
to reach equilibrium. There are a number of reasons why there may be asymmetric
adjustment of mortgage rates to changes in input costs that are favourable to the
lender and unfavourable to the borrower.
First, if there is su±cient market concentration, or if banks have some market power,
which from Allen and Liu (2007) we believe to be the case, there is scope for banks to
coordinate prices explicitly or implicitly. If input prices are not fully transparent, a
bank that is acting collusively may be hesitant to lower its mortgage rate after a fall in
its input costs, since other banks may interpret this as a sign of deviation. An increase
in the bank's mortgage rate, however, is a signal that funding costs have increased.
Even if input prices are fully transparent, if input prices fall and no bank reduces
its mortgage rate, all banks will earn higher pro¯ts. However, if one bank lowers its
price, all banks will immediately follow, and the bank that originally lowered its price
will not gain market share.
Second, if search is costly or input prices are volatile, it may be possible for banks
to maintain their current high rate even after input costs have fallen, because it will
take customers some time to realize that rates should have fallen. This is especially
important in price-inelastic markets. It may seem that this argument would not hold
in the latter part of our sample when mortgage rates are posted on the Internet.
However, the literature on online markets generally ¯nds that search costs are not
zero even in these markets;15 Bakos (2001) provides a good discussion. The fact
that posted prices di®er from transactions prices in the Canadian mortgage market
provides further evidence that search costs remain a factor in that market.
15In a CMHC survey conducted in 2005, roughly 55 per cent of Canadian mortgage purchasers
and 27 per cent of mortgage renewers reported searching the Internet for a rate. Less than 3 per cent
completed a mortgage application online and the average Canadian mortgage borrower negotiated
with two or fewer ¯nancial institutions when searching for a mortgage (CMHC (2005)).
12Third, some features of the Canadian mortgage market could cause banks to adjust
mortgage rates upwards more quickly than downwards when there is a change in their
input cost. For example, banks generally o®er a 60 to 120-day rate guarantee when
they approve a mortgage application. The terms are such that, if mortgage rates
rise during the guarantee period but before the mortgage is ¯nalized, the client will
receive the guaranteed rate; if mortgage rates fall, the client will receive the lower
prevailing rate. This would induce banks to react more slowly to cut than to increase
rates. Many mortgages also include early payment options, a borrower option that
raises the cost of a mortgage to the lender. Banks may therefore be slower to pass on
input cost decreases than increases.
Of course, pricing asymmetry may also favour borrowers. Banks encounter moral-
hazard and adverse-selection problems when they raise loan rates in response to higher
market rates. Speci¯cally, by increasing interest rates, banks leave themselves with a
riskier pool of borrowers. Banks may be slower, therefore, to raise rates when facing
a temporary cost increase.
Most studies of asymmetric pricing of loans and deposits ¯nd that the asymmetries
favour the lender. See, for example, Neumark and Sharpe (1992) and Hannan and
Berger (1991) for the U.S. deposit market; Allen, Rutherford, and Wiley (1999) and
Arbatskaya and Baye (2004) for the U.S. mortgage market; Mojon (2000) for loan
and deposit rates in many European countries; and de Haan and Sterken (2005) and
Toolsema and Jacobs (2001) for the Dutch mortgage market using macro and micro
data, respectively. A few papers, however, ¯nd asymmetries that favour the borrower,
such as Frost and Bowden (1999) for New Zealand mortgage rates; Chong, Liu, and
Shrestha (2006) for Singapore loan rates; and Liu, Margaritis, and Tourani-Rad (2008)
for New Zealand loan rates.















i;t¡1 + ºi;t; (3)
where for Yt 2 fBt;²i;t¡1g, Y
+
t = maxf0;Ytg and Y
¡
t = minf0;Ytg, ^ ² are the residuals
from the ¯rst-stage regression, (2), and Bt =
P3
s=0 b¡s
4 . Given the lumpiness of weekly
price movements, we use Bt to smooth price changes across a month. Collectively,
(¸+;¸¡) are amount-asymmetry parameters and (!+;!¡) are adjustment-asymmetry
parameters. Amount asymmetry concerns short run dynamics { whether mortgage
13prices respond as quickly to input price increases as they do to price decreases.16 The
adjustment-asymmetry parameters measure whether prices move towards the long
run equilibrium from below at the same rate as they do from above.
Table 11 reports parameter estimates for the 3-year posted rates. Tables 12 and 13
report estimates for the 5-year posted and discounted rates, respectively. None of the
amount-asymmetry parameters (¸+;¸¡) are statistically di®erent for any mortgage
term or type. This means that banks respond similarly to input cost increases and
decreases on impact. The adjustment-asymmetry parameters, however, are statisti-
cally di®erent in some cases. Speci¯cally, the parameters are statistically di®erent for
NAT, BNS, RBC, and TD for 3-year posted rates, and also for TD for 5-year posted
rates. With the exception of MTL, once we control for the discount rate, we reject
the null hypothesis of no adjustment asymmetry. This means that most banks adjust
their rates upwards when they are below equilibrium more quickly than they adjust
them downwards when they are above equilibrium. One reason for this ¯nding is
that discounting in the ¯rst experiment puts the discount into the residuals, blowing
them up and masking any price asymmetry. Once we control for the discounts, we
uncover price discrimination associated with the increasing search costs imposed by
discounting. That is, we ¯nd pricing asymmetry in the short run for all banks except
MTL.
An important caveat of this analysis is that we do not use individual transactions
rates (i.e., the rate that individual customers pay). Using aggregated prices may
mask demographic and geographical heterogeneity in transactions prices that may be
due to di®erences in market concentration.17;18 A more thorough analysis of pricing
asymmetry would require actual transactions prices.
16This is equivalent to asking whether the price increases as fully as input price decreases in the
short run.
17For example, young urban dwellers are more likely to receive higher discounts than older individ-
uals, mostly because the young are new customers. Older customers face higher switching costs, and
are therefore less likely to receive a high discount. Very few Canadians, regardless of demographic
grouping, appear to switch banks { only 3.1 per cent of households surveyed by Ipsos Reid switched
between 1999 and 2006, according to Allen, Clark, and Houde (2008).
18Geographically, the heterogeneity in housing market conditions across Canadian cities (Allen,
Amano, Byrne, and Gregory (2006)) can lead to mortgage discounts that are di®erent across the
country.
144 Conclusion
This paper considers price movements in the Canadian mortgage market using indi-
vidual bank rates. First, we document tendencies in price leadership for the 1-, 3-,
and 5-year ¯xed-rate mortgages. For the majority of cases, the price leaders were the
two banks with the largest mortgage portfolios over our sample period. Second, we
examine short- and long-run pass-through from government bond rates to mortgage
rates. Based on posted mortgage rates, we ¯nd that pass-through is incomplete and
that the dominant banks tend to have the lowest pass-through and highest markups.
However, based on discounted rates, we ¯nd that pass-through is complete. We also
test for pricing asymmetry in the Canadian market for 3- and 5-year mortgages. We
¯nd almost no evidence of short run amount asymmetry, but we do ¯nd some evidence
of adjustment asymmetry, particularly once we control for discounting. Namely, rates
adjust slightly more quickly upwards than downwards.
In summary, most of our evidence suggests that the Canadian residential mortgage
market is imperfectly competitive. Speci¯cally, we ¯nd evidence that dominant banks
are price leaders and that banks introduce search costs by posting rates that di®er
from transactions rates. While pass-through is generally complete, there is some
short run pass-through asymmetry. Given the complete pass-through, we cannot
de¯nitively conclude that the mortgage rate-setting behaviour of the major banks is
imperfectly competitive. However, this may be due to the fact that we must rely
on aggregate rather than individual transactions rates. Analysis using transactions
prices would allow for more de¯nitive conclusions and would be a useful extension of
this work. A further extension would be to construct and estimate a structural model
of mortgage demand and supply. This would allow us to estimate the welfare costs (if
any) of the type of deviations from perfect competition that we report in this paper.
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17Table 1: Correlations, 1991-2007
Bank Rate 90-d BA 3-m T-bill 1yr Tbill 3-yr bond 5-yr bond 10-yr bond
Bank Rate 1
90-d BA 0.9950 1
3-m T-bill 0.9946 0.9981 1
1-yr T-bill 0.9666 0.9718 0.9711 1
3-yr bond 0.9135 0.9172 0.9202 0.9707 1
5-yr bond 0.8737 0.8759 0.8824 0.9367 0.9894 1
10-yr bond 0.8074 0.8071 0.8175 0.8727 0.9531 0.9853 1
Table 2: Number of Banks Changing Prices (%)
1-yr 3-yr 5-yr
No move 65.8 65.1 63.0
1 move 8.09 6.1 7.4
2 move 3.99 4.4 3.2
3 move 1.54 2.7 3.1
4 move 3.17 2.7 2.6
5 move 4.45 4.0 5.0
6 move 12.78 15.0 15.7
18Table 3: Probit Estimates: 1-Year Rates and Bank Rate
1991-2007 MTL BNS CIBC NAT RBC TD
RHS variables
L.MTL -0.751** -0.492* -0.495* -0.469* -0.576** -0.689**
L.BNS -0.999 -4.312** -0.584 -0.022 -0.139 0.140
L.CIBC 0.678 1.852** -0.415 1.609** 0.983* 1.654**
L.NAT -0.739 -0.337 -0.744 -5.519** -0.896 -0.970
L.RBC 1.233* 2.374** 1.867** 2.368** -0.634 2.106**
L.TD 0.132 0.382 -0.026 1.583* 0.746 -2.733**
L.Brate 0.282** 0.327** 0.257** 0.268** 0.345** 0.260**
1991-2000 MTL BNS CIBC NAT RBC TD
RHS variables
L.MTL -4.458** -0.810 -0.785 -2.152* -0.277 1.032
L.BNS -0.986 -4.835** -0.838 -0.678 -0.329 -0.804
L.CIBC 2.190* 2.404* -1.999* 2.961** 2.832** 2.521*
L.NAT -0.823 -0.216 -0.471 -6.546** -0.712 -1.246
L.RBC 1.543 3.109** 3.586** 4.000** -3.033** 2.474
L.TD 1.951 -0.264 -0.085 1.919 0.911 -4.529*
L.Brate 0.353** 0.406** 0.383** 0.343** 0.413** 0.350**
2001-2007 MTL BNS CIBC NAT RBC TD
RHS variables
L.MTL -0.512* -0.320 -0.469 -0.265 -0.573* -0.699**
L.BNS -0.223 -3.893** 0.954 1.447 -0.527 0.899
L.CIBC -0.198 1.527* -0.568 1.549* 0.150 1.628**
L.NAT -1.236 -0.981 -1.592 -7.081** -0.442 -0.926
L.RBC 0.346 1.847* 0.790 1.366 -0.331 1.993**
L.TD 2.060 1.756 1.138 2.939* 1.647 -3.130**
L.Brate -0.285 -0.093 -0.368 -0.284 -0.042 -0.015
Note: ¤ and ¤¤ denote signi¯cance at the 1 per cent and 5 per cent level, respectively.
19Table 4: Probit Estimates: 1-Year Rates and 1-Year TBill Rate
1991-2007 MTL BNS CIBC NAT RBC TD
RHS variables
L.MTL -0.890** -0.585* -0.615** -0.562* -0.666** -0.745**
L.BNS -0.528 -4.264** -0.079 0.535 0.432 0.525
L.CIBC -0.339 1.008* -1.570** 0.800 0.019 0.810
L.NAT -0.782 -0.206 -0.782 -5.919** -0.965 -1.095
L.RBC 0.536 1.865** 1.210* 1.840** -1.490** 1.436*
L.TD 0.692 0.914 0.543 2.112** 1.373* -2.140**
L.Tbill 1.080** 1.009** 1.086** 0.955** 1.070** 0.921**
1991-2000 MTL BNS CIBC NAT RBC TD
RHS variables
L.MTL -3.597** 0.620 0.720 -1.038 0.973 2.341
L.BNS -0.946 -5.427** -0.798 -0.564 -0.289 -0.796
L.CIBC 0.852 1.201 -4.204** 1.875 1.580 1.202
L.NAT -0.642 0.083 -0.172 -6.750** -0.484 -0.988
L.RBC 2.054 3.776** 4.475** 4.410** -2.933** 3.413
L.TD 0.759 -1.794 -1.655 0.747 -0.346 -6.665**
L.Tbill 1.285** 1.341** 1.420** 1.178** 1.310** 1.289**
2001-2007 MTL BNS CIBC NAT RBC TD
RHS variables
L.MTL -0.022 0.250 -0.046 0.228 -0.127 -0.193
L.BNS -1.457 -5.636** 0.048 0.861 -1.401 0.311
L.CIBC -1.542* 0.491 -1.860** 0.553 -0.972 0.494
L.NAT -0.866 -0.522 -1.233 -8.148** 0.000 -0.456
L.RBC 0.916 2.574** 1.305 1.888* 0.041 2.889**
L.TD 0.174 -0.346 -0.808 1.650 -0.135 -6.406**
L.Tbill 3.314** 3.624** 2.987** 3.121** 2.978** 3.712**
Note: ¤ and ¤¤ denote signi¯cance at the 1 per cent and 5 per cent level, respectively.
20Table 5: Probit Estimates: 3-Year Rates and Bank Rate
1991-2007 MTL BNS CIBC NAT RBC TD
RHS variables
L.MTL -0.656* -0.206 -0.057 -0.200 -0.637* -0.249
L.BNS -0.790 -5.013** 0.500 -1.111 0.885 -0.881
L.CIBC 1.048 3.526** -2.783** 2.608** 1.182 2.752**
L.NAT -0.389 -0.225 -0.398 -4.757** 0.094 0.089
L.RBC 0.280 1.572** 0.344 1.384** -1.724** 0.696
L.TD 0.259 0.104 2.063** 1.767* -0.059 -2.687**
L.Brate 0.163** 0.159* 0.213** 0.193** 0.176** 0.157**
1991-2000 MTL BNS CIBC NAT RBC TD
RHS variables
L.MTL -5.986** -0.417 -0.574 -0.945 -0.896 -0.649
L.BNS -0.544 -7.816** -0.715 -1.389 0.248 -1.993
L.CIBC 1.862 2.699* -3.067** 2.018 1.013 2.211*
L.NAT 0.412 1.376 -0.154 -3.877** 0.945 1.070
L.RBC 3.220 4.089* 2.917 3.556* -2.598 1.631
L.TD 0.687 -0.267 1.239 0.313 0.955 -2.592*
L.Brate 0.176* 0.194** 0.215** 0.181* 0.185* 0.167*
2001-2007 MTL BNS CIBC NAT RBC TD
RHS variables
L.MTL -0.604 -0.628 -0.063 -0.252 -0.744* -0.304
L.BNS -0.133 -3.525** 1.253 -0.119 1.686 0.724
L.CIBC 1.831 5.687** -2.356* 4.080** 2.592** 4.937**
L.NAT -1.813* -1.928* -1.331 -6.966** -0.884 -1.717
L.RBC -0.296 0.394 -0.240 0.576 -2.223** -0.333
L.TD 0.787 -0.018 2.090* 2.109* -0.734 -3.759**
L.Brate 0.155 0.076 0.275* 0.302* 0.171 0.215
Note: ¤ and ¤¤ denote signi¯cance at the 1 per cent and 5 per cent level, respectively.
21Table 6: Probit Estimates: 5-Year Rates and Bank Rate
1991-2007 MTL BNS CIBC NAT RBC TD
RHS variables
L.MTL -0.781* -0.334 -0.465 -0.298 -0.520 -0.570
L.BNS -2.834** -9.921** -0.094 -3.062** -1.146 -2.136*
L.CIBC 1.867* 4.727** -3.323** 3.425** 2.892** 1.464*
L.NAT -0.776 -0.811 -0.871 -6.341** 0.009 -1.540*
L.RBC 2.222** 6.038** 4.436** 5.921** -1.654* 2.538**
L.TD 0.158 0.115 0.129 0.185 0.271* 0.102
L.Brate 0.095 0.119* 0.119* 0.100* 0.084 0.092
1991-2000 MTL BNS CIBC NAT RBC TD
RHS variables
L.MTL -4.120* 0.185 -0.791 0.691 -0.231 1.700
L.BNS -1.863 -7.947** -1.026 -2.357 -0.875 -3.249**
L.CIBC 1.747 2.624* -3.645** 1.494 1.479 1.684
L.NAT -0.164 -0.509 -0.523 -4.518** 0.138 0.243
L.RBC 2.028 5.012** 2.927 2.781 -3.757* 2.475
L.TD 2.088 0.379 2.773 1.658 2.982* -3.120*
L.Brate 0.154* 0.158* 0.197** 0.172** 0.176** 0.156*
2001-2007 MTL BNS CIBC NAT RBC TD
RHS variables
L.MTL -0.769* -0.493 -0.419 -0.359 -0.682 -0.712*
L.BNS -1.964 -11.028** 0.985 -1.351 0.289 -1.927
L.CIBC 3.329* 7.358** -3.745** 8.973** 5.552** 3.511**
L.NAT -3.022* -1.613 -1.292 -13.913** -1.835 -4.495**
L.RBC 2.313 5.413** 4.176** 6.289** -3.737* 3.518*
L.TD 0.117 0.122 0.104 0.248 0.291* 0.081
L.Brate -0.049 0.041 -0.010 -0.060 -0.101 -0.039
Note: ¤ and ¤¤ denote signi¯cance at the 1 per cent and 5 per cent level, respectively.
22Table 7: Probit Estimates: 3-Year Rates and Adjusted 3-Year Bond Rate
1991-2007 MTL BNS CIBC NAT RBC TD
RHS variables
L.MTL -0.801** -0.310 -0.109 -0.307 -0.791** -0.329
L.BNS -0.647 -5.434** 0.674 -1.044 1.264 -0.726
L.CIBC 0.806 3.727** -3.508** 2.700** 0.984 2.735**
L.NAT -1.117 -1.048 -1.123 -6.120** -0.563 -0.610
L.RBC -0.285 1.147* -0.118 0.965 -2.573** 0.193
L.TD 0.623 0.545 2.720** 2.403** 0.256 -2.668**
L.Brate 1.181** 1.142** 1.189** 1.139** 1.184** 1.130**
1991-2000 MTL BNS CIBC NAT RBC TD
RHS variables
L.MTL -5.688** 0.871 0.758 -0.475 -0.392 -0.065
L.BNS 0.635 -8.618** -0.112 -0.501 1.385 -1.284
L.CIBC 1.098 1.873 -4.815** 1.222 -0.080 1.411
L.NAT -1.088 0.464 -1.575 -6.075** -0.356 -0.191
L.RBC 2.772 4.285 2.910 3.892* -3.212* 1.630
L.TD 0.737 -0.311 1.313 0.439 1.123 -2.941*
L.Brate 1.333** 1.277** 1.361** 1.333** 1.361** 1.266**
2001-2007 MTL BNS CIBC NAT RBC TD
RHS variables
L.MTL 0.485 0.456 1.309** 0.801* 0.184 1.025**
L.BNS -0.811 -4.996** 0.850 -1.081 1.493 0.197
L.CIBC -0.298 4.425** -6.041** 2.445* 0.752 3.242**
L.NAT -1.955* -2.307* -1.300 -7.899** -0.777 -1.672
L.RBC 0.187 0.933 0.391 1.543* -2.197** 0.236
L.TD -0.666 -1.422 0.908 1.186 -2.233* -6.694**
L.Brate 3.059** 3.053** 3.531** 2.789** 2.709** 3.450**
Note: ¤ and ¤¤ denote signi¯cance level at 1% and 5% level, respectively.
23Table 8: Probit Estimates: 5-Year Rates and Adjusted 5-Year Bond Rate
1991-2007 MTL BNS CIBC NAT RBC TD
RHS variables
L.MTL -1.244** -0.730* -0.889** -0.686* -0.959** -1.006**
L.BNS -2.422** -10.229** 0.612 -2.519* -0.576 -1.551
L.CIBC 1.646* 4.843** -4.132** 3.310** 2.856** 1.212
L.NAT -0.978 -0.916 -1.020 -6.853** -0.091 -1.818**
L.RBC 1.598 5.688** 4.040** 5.427** -2.797** 1.857*
L.TD -0.030 -0.061 -0.062 0.016 0.084 -0.095
L.Brate 1.214** 1.179** 1.217** 1.087** 1.245** 1.190**
1991-2000 MTL BNS CIBC NAT RBC TD
RHS variables
L.MTL -4.974** 0.191 -1.101 0.213 -0.713 1.445
L.BNS -0.982 -7.900** -0.381 -1.209 0.201 -2.447
L.CIBC 1.266 2.097 -4.912** 0.881 0.988 1.263
L.NAT -0.641 -0.692 -0.870 -5.099** -0.245 -0.167
L.RBC 2.414 5.650** 3.615* 3.036 -3.984* 2.935
L.TD 1.399 -0.722 2.127 0.821 2.221 -4.577**
L.Brate 1.332** 1.230** 1.382** 1.231** 1.390** 1.379**
2001-2007 MTL BNS CIBC NAT RBC TD
RHS variables
L.MTL -0.126 0.195 0.420 0.461 0.200 -0.062
L.BNS 0.801 -10.524** 5.099** 1.282 3.619* 0.503
L.CIBC 1.087 6.717** -8.528** 8.286** 4.207** 1.531
L.NAT -5.600** -4.214** -3.507* -19.365** -4.164** -7.123**
L.RBC -1.322 2.515 0.812 4.175* -9.898** 0.592
L.TD 0.282 0.323 0.280 0.449** 0.522** 0.203
L.Brate 5.028** 4.885** 5.345** 4.677** 5.413** 4.448**
Note: ¤ and ¤¤ denote signi¯cance level at 1% and 5% level, respectively.
24Table 9: Cointegration Tests
Three Year Bond Five Year Bond Five Year Bond w. Discounting
Variable ERS PP ERS PP ERS PP
CIBC -1.979 -7.834 -1.867 -7.615 -4.659 -8.726
MTL -2.166 -6.995 -2.785 -7.043 -5.105 -7.572
NAT -2.036 -7.760 -2.057 -7.726 -4.625 -8.771
BNS -2.205 -7.713 -1.932 -7.639 -4.848 -8.705
RBC -2.383 -7.699 -1.973 -7.703 -5.084 -8.894
TD -2.140 -7.770 -1.845 -5.696 -3.760 -6.528
Notes: We report Elliott, Rothenberg, and Stock ¿ test statistics (ERS) and Phillips-Perron
test-statistics. The 5 per cent critical value for the ERS test is -1.964 and for the PP test it is
-2.860. The lag selection for the ERS test is chosen using the MAIC criterion (Ng and Perron
2001). The null hypothesis is that the residual from the interest rate equation has a unit root.
Table 10: Long Run Estimates
3-Year Bond 5-Year Bond 5-Year Bond with Discounting
Variable ®i ¯i ®i ¯i ®i ¯i
CIBC 2.867 0.803¤ 3.001 0.804¤ 1.095 1.000
MTL 2.810 0.808¤ 2.975 0.805¤ 1.049 1.005
NAT 2.820 0.807¤ 2.980 0.809¤ 1.077 1.003
BNS 2.760 0.813¤ 2.992 0.804¤ 1.079 1.003
RBC 2.694 0.820¤ 3.000 0.802¤ 1.088 1.003
TD 2.825 0.807¤ 2.950 0.809¤ 0.944 1.019
Notes: ¤ denotes ¯i signi¯cantly di®erent from 1 at the 5 per cent level. Residuals are modelled
as GARCH(1,1). For MTL and TD 5-year rates we include a dummy variable for the \no haggle"
subperiod.









i H0 : ¸+ = ¸¡ H0 : !+ = !¡
CIBC 0.301 0.390 -0.115 -0.178 1.22 2.64
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) [0.270] [0.105]
MTL 0.321 0.354 -0.114 -0.140 0.16 0.48
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) [0.689] [0.487]
NAT 0.252 0.329 -0.108 -0.199 0.84 5.03
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) [0.360] [0.025]
BNS 0.307 0.391 -0.112 -0.180 1.11 3.35
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) [0.293] [0.068]
RBC 0.294 0.387 -0.104 -0.195 1.33 5.74
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) [0.249] [0.017]
TD 0.259 0.359 -0.098 -0.198 1.52 6.56
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) [0.218] [0.011]
Notes: p-values for the null hypothesis that the parameters are equal to zero are shown in
parentheses. p-values for the null hypothesis that coe±cients are equal are shown in square brack-
ets.





i H0 : ¸+ = ¸¡ H0 : !+ = !¡
CIBC 0.354 0.569 -0.116 -0.127 2.31 0.08
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) [0.129] [0.779]
MTL 0.393 0.466 -0.113 -0.110 0.26 0.01
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) [0.610] [0.936]
NAT 0.325 0.500 -0.109 -0.151 1.34 0.94
(0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) [0.248] [0.333]
BNS 0.337 0.545 -0.104 -0.137 2.14 0.71
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) [0.144] [0.399]
RBC 0.339 0.516 -0.107 -0.148 1.59 1.07
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) [0.207] [0.301]
TD 0.518 0.525 -0.132 -0.047 0.00 4.79
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) [0.962] [0.029]
Notes: p-values for the null hypothesis that the parameters are equal to zero are shown in
parentheses. p-values for the null hypothesis that coe±cients are equal are shown in square brack-
ets. For MTL and TD we include a dummy variable for the \no haggle" subperiod.





i H0 : ¸+ = ¸¡ H0 : !+ = !¡
CIBC 0.192 0.397 -0.106 -0.238 2.34 11.35
(0.036) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) [0.135] [0.001]
MTL 0.378 0.337 -0.123 -0.130 0.04 0.09
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) [0.837] [0.767]
NAT 0.168 0.319 -0.092 -0.275 1.08 19.35
(0.077) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) [0.300] [0.000]
BNS 0.165 0.377 -0.097 -0.245 2.38 14.8
(0.073) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) [0.124] [0.000]
RBC 0.162 0.338 -0.098 -0.268 1.71 19.55
(0.068) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) [0.192] [0.000]
TD 0.491 0.443 -0.129 -0.069 0.15 3.11
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) [0.702] [0.078]
Note: p-values for the null hypothesis that the parameters are equal to zero are shown in paren-
theses. p-values for the null hypothesis that coe±cients are equal are shown in square brackets.
For MTL and TD we include a dummy variable for the \no haggle" subperiod.
27Appendix: Data Descriptions
The following statistics are available through the \Bank of Canada Banking and
Financial Statistics" and \Weekly Financial Statistics" and through CANSIM. CAN-
SIM identi¯ers are speci¯ed. All mortgage rates are in per cent and all outstanding
values are in nominal Canadian dollars.
² Bank Rate (source: Bank of Canada) - v122785, v39078
² 90-day Bankers' acceptance rate (source: Bank of Canada) - v121775
² 91-day treasury bill rate (source: Bank of Canada) - v121778
² 1-year treasury bill rate (source: Bank of Canada) - v121801
² 3-year Government of Canada bond yield (source: Bank of Canada) - v121787
² 5-year Government of Canada bond yield (source: Bank of Canada) - v121788
² Residential mortgage credit outstanding (source: Bank of Canada) - v122746
² Total credit outstanding (source: Bank of Canada) - v122648
² The swap spread (source: Bloomberg) is the spread over 5-year Government
of Canada bond yields that commercial banks must pay to swap 4- to 5-year
¯xed-term funding back to °oating rate funds.
² Mortgage rates (source: CANNEX via the Globe and Mail newspaper) -
The newspaper reports mortgage rates every Wednesday. Financial institutions
included in the study include: Royal Bank of Canada (RBC), Canadian Impe-
rial Bank of Canada (CIBC), Bank of Montreal (MTL), Scotia Bank (BNS),
National Bank of Canada (NAT), Toronto-Dominion Bank (TD), Laurentian
Bank, ING, First Line, London Life, HSBC, Montreal Trust, National Trust,
Royal Trust, Canada Trust, General Trust, Alberta Treasury Branch, and Cen-
tral Guaranty Trust.
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